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RECONCEPTUALIZING VALUE CREATION WHEN
RESOURCES ARE LIMITED 
In traditional economics and finance the notion of value crea-
tion is virtually synonymous with the net present value of cash
flows.  Such a characterization implies that all of the uses of re-
source inputs, such as raw material and energy, are known and
that their value is priced into commodities markets.  It also fails
to allow for the opportunity cost associated with the deple-
tion of resources which, with advancing technology, might rea-
sonably have future uses far greater in value than can be
achieved at present with current technology.  Stated differently,
in traditional valuation analysis the option value associated with
scarce resources –when new technology or knowledge can be
applied to them– is not addressed.  In the present work, we de-
fine technology leverage as representative of this effect. We des-
cribe an analytical approach to address this gap in the literature,
centered around the notion of technology leverage. We then
address the problem of sustainability of organizations by sta-
ting four propositions and examining the implications for go-
vernment policy and for firm governance of incorporating the
full impact of scarce resource utilization into value creation me-
asurement, decision-making, and the distribution of the value
thus created among various stakeholders.
Traditionally, value is assumed to be created when physical re-
sources are identified, appropriated, processed, and distributed
such that output revenue exceeds total cost –including inves-
tment costs– and thus leads to cash flows. Yet such a concep-
tualization of value created is generally limited to shareholder
value.  In contrast, we argue that value is created upstream from
decisions regarding its distribution, whether to shareholders or
others.  Value is created within the firm when it has access to
resources and when knowledge and technology are effectively
leveraged against said resources through the firm's organiza-
tional capabilities and operational know-how.  Once created,
the entirety of value may be distributed to shareholders, but
more often only part of it is. Other stakeholders often benefit
as well, such as labor (employees or management), customers,
government, and the community. 
Considered in this way, value can be measured using cash flows,
but only when accounting for all of the relevant costs, including
the opportunity costs associated with resource scarcity, for
example, when a scarce mineral is no longer available for per-
haps unknown uses in the future..  On the other hand, distri-
butions—even excess distributions to labor or management in
the form of above market compensation—should not impact
the value creation calculation. In such a framework, value is not
synonymous with accounting profits nor with flows only to sha-
reholders.  Rather, it is the sum of benefits created by techno-
logical leverage of resources (defined below), and accruing to all
stakeholders.
We can think of the efficiency with which value is created as the
ratio of output value to units of input (labor or resources, or
indeed both), and is a measure of the technological leverage ap-
plied to scarce natural resources in the creation of economic
value. Note that, so defined, when the price of input resources
increases due to growing scarcity, technology leverage remains
constant ceteris paribus even where profits decline.   When re-
sources are considered scarce and there is sufficient variance
in technology leverage, consumption of natural resources by
low technology leverage industries is particularly costly because
less of that same resource is made available for high leverage in-
dustries, be it in the present or the future. The use of natural
gas to burn for heat may have low technology leverage, com-
pared with transforming it into polymers, plastics, or pharma-
ceutical products (high technology leverage activities) is one
example.  As will be argued later, although there is a tradition of
maintaining that pricing mechanisms in commodity or factor mar-
kets account for this effect, we argue that markets alone do not
fully compensate for the differential effect of technology leve-
rage. Future gains in knowledge that increase technology leverage
are not accounted for in today’s markets, and the value-creating
potential of new knowledge is not bounded in any strict sense. 
Finally, because evolutionary, cognitive, and other processes lead
to increased organization and complexity, and because kno-
wledge and technology are products of such processes, it is
plausible that technology leverage increases over time. If so, re-
sources conserved for the future may ultimately be consumed
by higher technology leverage activities.  The negative value cre-
ated by uneconomical consumption of resources today is in
such a case likely to be systematically underestimated. This is es-
pecially so when one considers the large scale macro dynamics.
After briefly reviewing current conceptions of value, resource
utilization, and sustainability, we describe a new perspective
based upon explicit assumptions about how value is created.
We suggest four propositions derived from our assumptions,
and discuss their implication to governmental policy and firm
governance in a global economy with limited resources.  In the
final section, we discuss future research directions.
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON VALUE AND SUS-
TAINABILITY
Before suggesting a new approach to understanding value cre-
ation, we briefly review current thinking regarding value, tech-
nology, and resources which implies that a rethinking of current
perspectives is both timely and appropriate.
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The Theory of Value Creation
The literature on value theories in economics and finance is
truly encyclopedic and, because of obvious space restrictions, is
for the most part beyond our present scope.  Debreu’s (1959)
monograph is a useful starting point, however, because in it he
sets down a self-contained axiomatic, mathematical treatment
of the notion of value, and his principal results still underlie
most economic theory in use today.   Debreu highlighted some
limitations of such an analysis in his treatment of value, and sub-
sequent work built upon these implicit assumptions. As he puts
it:
One may stress here the certainty assumption made, at the level
of interpretations throughout the analysis… according to which
every producer knows his future production possibilities and every
consumer knows his future consumption possibilities (and his fu-
ture resources if resources are privately owned—otherwise only
the future total resources need to be known) (p.xi).
We focus precisely on the informational limitations that ren-
der the above assumptions unrealistic. In what follows, we cha-
llenge the manner in which such reasoning has been applied.
While it is recognized that these assumptions are not literally
true, this fact has not always been recognized in their applica-
tion. Specifically, we are concerned with the assumption that
“every producer knows his future production possibilities,” is
not always considered and we elucidate the implications that
devolve from the assumption that every producer knows, “his
future resources if resources are privately owned” and the total
resources for resources that are publicly owned.
Resource Based View of the Firm and Other Resource Ap-
proaches
In the same year that Debreu published his monograph, Penrose
(1959) introduced ideas that would form what came to be ca-
lled the resource-based view of the firm.  Her fundamental in-
sight was that, contrary to insights obtained using traditional
economics methodology, firms can find positions within the en-
vironment where they can sustain competitive advantage in
ways that can increase firm longevity. As Barney (1986, 1991)
and Peteraf (1993) later pointed out, this apparent anomaly wi-
thin economic theory resulted from sustained preferential and
sustainable access to resources. When knowledge is explicitly
included in the equations (Makadok, 2001, 2002) we may con-
clude that preferential access to resources and proprietary
knowledge with respect to processing resources can indeed re-
sult in the sustained production of economic rent and thus sus-
tained competitive advantage even in competitive markets.
Toyota’s lean production system is an example of this. 
So according to this line of reasoning, firms which set as their
purposes 1) the acquisition of the preferential access to re-
sources and 2) the accumulation of knowledge, proprietary or
public, (the latter increasing the leverage with which resources
can be processed) are the most likely to achieve firm longevity
independent of pursuit of maximum profits. Whether or not
achieving maximum profits is consistent with firm longevity de-
pends on information access since, recalling Debreu’s quote,
economic theory assumes perfect knowledge by producers and
consumers, and explicit equality between the present and fu-
ture uses or resources. 
Under such a pristine theoretical framework, maximizing pro-
fits is synonymous with firm longevity because perfect kno-
wledge is assumed.  However, when uncertainty is considered
and practical considerations are included, significant differen-
ces result.  For example, both labor costs and resource costs
must be minimized to maximize accounting profits, at least in
the short term. The short-term tradeoff is clearly in the interest
of capital in the face of uncertainty.  By ensuring that capital re-
ceives its maximum return on investment, a return that can be
recycled into other projects and purposes as situations change,
capital retains its flexibility as unforeseen circumstances alter
the prospects of each organization independently.  The benefit
to capital remains tenable even though the labor –or, more ge-
nerally, human capital– that is being eliminated includes kno-
wledge or technical know-how that may provide critical
flexibility as a particular organization struggles to adjust as its
circumstances change.
Likewise, while surplus resources or “organizational slack”
(Cyert & March, 1963), may be indispensable to the organiza-
tion in enabling it to adapt in future situations, such excess re-
sources must be shed if profits are to be maximized.  Capital
does not care because it maintains its flexibility, but the other
stakeholders suffer.  Thus the maxim of “maximum profits” ne-
cessitates eliminating flexibility for the organization in return
for a unique benefit that accrues to capital.  By accumulating
profits, capital retains the flexibility necessary for its aims, but
it does so at the expense of the same flexibility that would be-
nefit the organization that capital has supported. 
One might argue that the notion of resource sustainability does
not apply, precisely in a world where human knowledge and
technologies can be utilized to develop viable substitutes for
resources that may have been exhausted. The received wisdom
in economics, in fact, is that we never literally run out of re-
sources. Increased scarcity is reflected in a rising price, until the
price chokes off further demand and the “backstop” techno-
logy or resource is summoned as a substitute (so-called relative
scarcity). Moreover, most “green accounting” methodologies
employed by economists (e.g. El Serafy and Lutz, 1989) assume
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(implicitly –we doubt that many would make such a claim) that
in situ resources and fixed capital (e.g., tools, machines, etc.) are
essentially substitutable. One therefore might conclude that
concern over sustainability is at best overstated and at worst
pernicious insofar as company profits are concerned.
We have two responses to such a claim. First, it is undeniable
that we live today in a world where natural resources, not labor,
is the limiting factor in production. One hundred fifty to 200
years ago, one might have reasonably argued that it was the re-
verse: human impact on resource stocks and the natural envi-
ronment was minimal, and labor was relatively scarce. But such
a claim would never withstand scrutiny in today’s global, heavily
populated, and mass-consumption-oriented world. Basic eco-
nomics dictates that in such a changed world we should be eco-
nomizing on our natural resources, not continuing to pretend
that they are “free” assets.
Second, despite seemingly limitless human ingenuity in relation
to technology, we must recognize there must be some limit to
how efficiently we can use our resources. Relative scarcity
might reign supreme as concerns individual resources, but when
we consider the aggregate of exhaustible resources extant
worldwide, these must be considered scarce in an absolute
sense. To be sure, there is enormous uncertainty over when re-
source limits might be reached, but we must also consider the
untold spillover effects of resource mining and general ecolo-
gical consequences that remain poorly understood. With com-
plex systems such as our natural environments, non-linearities
are likely to be present; in other words, minor costs associated
with environmental impact might suddenly become huge costs
as an ecological threshold is breached. This may or may not be
a problem for private business, but it is directly relevant to value
creation in general.
We argue that exclusive focus on return to capital is unsustai-
nable behavior, and that such behavior has led to shortened
lives of specific organizations. On the other hand, maximizing
more broadly conceived value is consistent with sustainability
(though even here probably only a necessary and not sufficient
condition). If economic rents can be assured by virtue of pre-
ferential positioning within resource fields, that is, access to cer-
tain resources not available to others, then profit maximization
(fundamental to a firm’s survival in the capital markets) is sub-
ordinated to the goal of sustainability. While, as we have seen,
pressure to maximize profits can operate against the interest of
the firm, when a firm establishes itself in a preferential resource
or knowledge position, flexibility is retained within the firm, and
less value is transferred to capital.  Short term accounting pro-
fits are not maximized because knowledgeable people are re-
tained and excess resources are stored, both of which reduce
accounting profits. Such flexibility supports firm sustainability
and leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: When all else is the same, there is a positive rela-
tionship between an organization’s ability to appropriate excess
knowledge and resources within the firm and the firm’s longevity.
It brings to mind an intriguing research question:  What if or-
ganizations in general and firms in particular did not maximize
profits as their singular objective?  What if, instead, firms pur-
sued longevity, and thus access to resources in general, with fi-
nancial capital being only one of these resources?  In such a
case, firms might appear to be “maximizing profits” insofar as
they try to retain access to capital resources, but they would ac-
tually be systematically deceiving the capital markets in pursuit
of their larger purpose.  This posturing is analogous to firms at-
tempting to appear “environmentally friendly” in an effort to
retain access to raw materials, or “worker friendly” (i.e., culti-
vating an image, for example, as one of the best companies to
work for) in an effort to retain access to workers.  As discus-
sed in the next section, the implications of this possibility are le-
gion.
Before exploring these questions, we should make clear that
we recognize the benefits that result from the discipline of ac-
tive capital markets within the economy. Such discipline has
been and will remain critical to continued economic growth
and prosperity.  We simply point out that as useful as a capital-
centric perspective has been for defining the modern economic
system, it oversimplifies the dynamics at work in the economy.
The consequences over the long run may be severe. Relying on
price signals as indicators of value is misleading, but the inac-
curacy of price as an indicator of value may not be troublesome
as concerns the private company in a micro context. The diffi-
culties arise in the macro context: repeated and persistent mis-
measure of value creation result in erroneous decisions which,
taken in concert, may produce disastrous outcomes. Of course
there is no manner of knowing what the effects will be a priori,
since the macro economy is so irreducibly complex.  Yet there
is much to be gained from exploring some of the dynamics and
sector interrelationships. This is the intent of our research.
RECONCEPTUALIZING VALUE CREATION AND
SUSTAINABILITY
When scarcity of naturally occurring resources and their per-
manent depletion are included in the framing of the problem of
value creation, different outcomes are inevitable.  In this section
we look at key definitions and assumptions underlying such an
approach and explore their implications.  We develop proposi-
tions that form the basis of a new conceptualization of value
creation and sustainability as a representation of the “purpose”
underlying human organizing activity. 
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Technology Leverage Defined
We first define technology leverage, τ ′, to be the instantaneous
rate of change of output value creation from changes in units
of the input resource, that is, it is a first derivative of the func-
tion, , that converts input units into output value.  In equation
form:
τ ′ (ri) = d τ(ri) / dri = dro / dri
Where ri are the units of input resources i,
τ(ri) is the function that describes the conversion of input
units i to output value, ro, and ro = τ(ri)is the value of output
due to input units i.
Technology leverage is a companion metric to labor productivity,
the ratio of output value per unit of labor, which measures how
effectively technology is used in support of human effort.  Labor
productivity recognizes the scarcity and value of labor and thus
seeks to maximize the economic benefit that devolves from
every labor hour.  Technology leverage, in contrast, measures
the impact of knowledge and technology on the output value
devolving from non-labor inputs to production. By measuring
and maximizing technology leverage, one would recognize the
scarcity and inherent value in natural resources and seek to
maximize the economic benefit that devolves from every unit
of natural resources consumed.
Although technology leverage, τ ′ (i.e., τ ′(t), for a given firm),
varies over time, it can be estimated at any moment by assu-
ming τ to be akin to the standard production function in eco-
nomics, and τ ′ to be the constant ratio of output value to units
of non-labor direct inputs. One would expect that when there
exist alternative uses for a given resource and different availa-
ble technologies across industries, there will be a significant dif-
ference in technology leverage across industries given the same
resource input. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When different outcomes across firms depend
upon the same input resource, there is a positive relationship
between the market value of technological knowledge deployed
and the level of technology leverage, τ ′, realized in the proces-
sing of the resource
The normative precept that technology leverage should be ma-
ximized in human organizational systems, both economic and
political, represents a profound point of departure from prior
economic theory, particularly when “free goods” such as air,
water, land, sea, etc., are considered to be scarce inputs. Not
only does such a notion come into conflict with the normative
approaches that currently dominate debate within finance and
economics communities, i.e., that profits should be maximized
(sometimes at the expense of the environment), it also has pro-
found policy implications of its own. These are discussed in a
later section.  Before addressing normative matters, however, it
is important to consider some real-world  examples of tech-
nology leverage and consider their practical implications.
Variance in Technology Leverage Across Industries on
the Same Resource
If we support Proposition 2, and if we assume that there are dif-
ferences in the value of technology –such as, for example, bet-
ween that provided by the internal combustion engine and that
offered by the synthetic construction of carbon fibers or phar-
maceuticals– then there is also a wide variance in technology
leverage deployed within the economy.  Some industries would
consume a resource with technology contributing relatively lit-
tle to output value.  Others might realize greater output value
from the same resource input, owing to superior technology.    
Consider for example some of the varying uses for fossil fuels.
As a possible example, at the low end, the energy industry
burns unprocessed fossil fuels, heavy oil, natural gas and coal, to
heat homes, a conversion process that would seem to have a
relatively low technology leverage on oil--it simply burns the
fuel and then it is gone.  Progressing up the scale, the petro-
chemical industry refines oil resources into more efficient fuel
products such as gasoline, kerosene etc. that can be used to
power transportation and other services.  We might assume
that this use of fossil fuels is characteristic of a medium tech-
nological leverage activity because the oil resource is being used
to move and thus utilize other resources within the economy.
On the high end of the scale, the plastics/synthetics industry
uses fossil fuels, e.g., natural gas, as an input to produce a wide
variety of synthetics such as plastics, fabrics composite mate-
rials used in many other industries. This use has high technology
leverage (why?).  All of these uses for the same natural resource,
fossil fuels, potentially produce very different value within the
economy.  
Silicon is another example of a resource with high variance in
technological leverage.  As one low leverage possibility, sand can
be gathered and sold to make artificial beaches for tourists
around the world. In contrast, a fistful of sand can make a sili-
con wafer that can then be used to make thousands of micro-
processors, surely an example of high technology leverage on
silicon.  
Perhaps most important, commodity pricing, such as pricing for
fossil fuels or sand, is based upon total demand across indus-
tries (Debreu, 1959) even though demand may be quite diffe-
rent across different uses of the same input resource. Market
pricing does not take into account variations in the value of
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outputs that derive from differences in technology leverage on
resources even though the value to the economy may be vastly
different depending upon the specific use. Price, in other words,
reflects the “value” to society given the presumably perfect –
but in reality far from perfect– state of knowledge.  Low tech-
nology leverage uses that have high demand may deplete scarce
resources which could turn out to have very high value using
future technology.  In these cases, these resources have real op-
tion value that is not being priced into the market. Again, while
this may have little import to a private firm, but in the long run
the squandered option value that would be a direct conse-
quence of sort-sighted resource use might carry significant
costs to society.
Does technology leverage matter?  A thought experi-
ment.
It is immediate from the preceding that ingenuity, scientific ad-
vance, and knowledge accumulation are the bases for any va-
riation in τ ′.  Innovation within an industry and within a firm
produces gains in technology leverage.  The structural changes
that occurred in the auto industry during the late twentieth
century are a useful illustration of how technology leverage can
change an industry.  A well-known Japanese company, Toyota,
introduced lean manufacturing techniques which had much hig-
her technology leverage on input resources, in part by signifi-
cantly reducing inventory requirements.  Because Toyota had
much less capital at it disposal than did its American competi-
tors, it was compelled to achieve higher technology leverage.
The fact that poorly capitalized firms can achieve higher tech-
nology leverage than their better capitalized competitors has
significant implications, particularly in situations when resour-
ces become scarce.
In his book Guns, Germs and Steel, Jared Diamond describes how
in human pre-history, domestication of plants and animals led to
more, and better production of, crops.  The focus, not surpri-
singly, is on the increased productivity of human labor –a small
number of farmers could feed an entire village– leading to sur-
plus resources and ultimately to social and political organization.
There is another story hidden between the lines of this tale,
however.  Innovations such as harvesting better seeds, breeding
stronger domestic animals, and developing new machines –
examples of technology leverage– made it possible to obtain a
larger harvest from a single ox, more edible grain out of a sin-
gle seedling, and generally, more output per unit of input  re-
gardless of how many humans were at work, i.e., more efficient
use of resources.  These are the stories of τ ′.
Consider for a moment a year of drought, a year when water
is so scarce that only one farm can be maintained.  Which far-
mer should be allocated the scarce water resource?  Undoub-
tedly, the farmer with the most technologically advanced seed,
domesticated animals, and machinery should receive the water
because said farmer will produce the greatest yield on water.
However, in a market based system, the farmer that gets the
water is the one with the largest stockpile of cash accumulated
from prior years when the necessary resource –water– was
not scarce. Thus, to answer the question, we must determine if
the farmer with the largest stockpile of cash would also, of ne-
cessity, have the best technology.  
Received wisdom from traditional economics, built, we must
recall, upon the limitations identified by Debreu, would assume
that the market mechanism favors the farmers with the best
technologies and therefore that, over time, such farmers would
produce the most profit and thus accumulate the most cash.
When water is plentiful, and essentially free, many seeds can be
sowed and watered, and thus it is labor productivity that de-
termines crop yield.  However, when labor is plentiful but water
is scarce, water must be conserved and a minimal amount of
seed must therefore be planted in order to conserve the water.
Thus it is the best seed technology, the highest yield seed, ra-
ther than labor productivity that determines overall crop yield.   
An increasingly influential perspective in the management lite-
rature, the resource based view of the firm (Barney, 1991), with
the addition of knowledge as a competitive differentiator (Ma-
kadok, 2001), is relevant to this analysis.  According to this view,
firms can protect their access to resources and knowledge and
achieve sustained competitive advantage. Thus it is at least pos-
sible that a recently developed seed technology on a smaller
farm employing less labor would be superior to the technolo-
gies in use on the larger farms.  This seed if planted and wate-
red would result in a higher overall yield.  When water becomes
scarce, however, it would be the farm with the cash that got
the water.  
As can be seen from this thought experiment, even in principle,
free markets do not often function adequately when maximi-
zing τ ′ rather than profits is the objective.  The above exam-
ple is increasingly relevant as labor productivity reaches all time
highs and labor is global and ubiquitous.  Previously plentiful re-
sources such as air, water, land, timber, and fossil fuels, on the
other hand are increasingly scarce. The extent to which natu-
ral resources are substitutable with other inputs is an open
question, but their absolute scarcity in an absolute sense now
make them the true limiting factor in production, and specifi-
cally value creation.
THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESOURCES ON VALUE
When resources are considered scarce, consumption of natu-
ral resources by low technology leverage firms –or, more bro-
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adly, industries– carries a cost to the whole(??) because less of
that same resource is available for high leverage industries. In an
increasingly constrained world resource market, such costs to
the economy must be considered in the market mechanisms
that set prices and determine value. Variability in input costs
originating from technology leverage differentials become an
additional factor in the net present value calculation in addition
to the time value of money. 
The implications of τ ′
As we formally describe below, because of differences in τ ′con-
servation is not simply a tradeoff between "using the resource
now or saving it for later."  Where the same resource is used
in the same manner and with the same technology leverage but
at different times, there is an economic argument that justifies
its immediate use.  In fact, any reasonable argument for con-
servation in such circumstances rests on moral or humanitarian,
as opposed to economic, grounds.1 [you need to do something
about this footnote] The choice nets to preference.  
There is more to consider with technology leverage, however.
We must also include in the analysis the efficiency with which
technology is used to leverage input resources into economic
value, and how that efficiency might be different between con-
suming scarce resources today versus consuming them at some
point in the future.   When technology is included, this choice
does not net to preference only, but implies the potential for a
real value difference in present value terms.  With changing
technology leverage and –as is eminently reasonable– assuming
uncertainty, scarce resources have option value.
Differences in Technology Leverage Implies Negative Cash
Flows from Opportunity Costs
We argue that differences in technology leverage create diffe-
rences in both the positive value achieved in consumption of re-
sources and the negative value for the opportunity lost in
depletion, and that such differences change the value equation.
To be clear, the negative value for opportunity cost is created
because scarce resources, when depleted, cannot be the basis
for value created in the future, and such negative value is mea-
sured by determining forgone cash flows in the future. Although
analytical methods for valuing options of this type are beyond
the scope of this paper, the approach highlights and potentially
quantifies the costs to the economy of depletions of hard mi-
nerals, water and atmosphere, fossil fuels, soils, forests, species
diversity, diversity in organic and biological compounds, ecolo-
gical systems, behavioral and social systems, and cultural diver-
sity. Where traditional economic methods and models are silent
on an important result from the evolutionary sciences –that di-
versity in and of itself is valuable in the evolution of complex
systems– by including option value our approach incorporates
the insight explicitly in our value calculations. From the above
follows our next proposition:
Proposition 3: Assuming constant technological leverage (τ ′) over
time and across industries, market pricing incorporates both the
current and future value of resources, and there is therefore no
economic benefit to conservation of resources beyond that sug-
gested by the discount rate.  When, on the other hand, τ ′(t) is
not assumed to be constant  there are conditions where:
1)   Conservation of privately owned resources can be shown to
have positive value to a firm and
2)   Conservation of public resources can be shown to have value
for an economy overall. 
Stated differently, there is an additional criterion –which ac-
counts for the true benefits of waiting– that should be met be-
fore resources are consumed. It is not unlike the precautionary
principle that some argue should guide much environmental
policy. We turn next to the difficult problem of calculating such
a threshold value and incorporating these results in decision
models.
The impact of non-zero value for conservation in decision
making
A key result from the developing field of complexity science is
that evolutionary, cognitive, and other processes lead to incre-
ased organization and complexity.  In addition, an increase in
knowledge and technology are natural products of these pro-
cesses as physical and social structures. Unlike many other evo-
lutionary changes that some (e.g., Gould) argue proceed in a
non-directional fashion –i.e., may wax or wane over time– kno-
wledge or technology may be characterized as a ratchet. It
moves in only one direction, toward improvement.
1 When one chooses to consume resources today, benefit is realized today (approximately) in today’s dollars.  This is the positive value term in today’s
dollars from using the resource today.  There is also a negative value term (opportunity cost), however, in the equation.  This term can also be expres-
sed in today’s dollars and results because the resource (consumed today) can’t be used in the future. In traditional economic theory, this opportunity
cost is assumed to be captured in the pricing dynamics at work in the commodities markets.  Current value and future value lost are by definition
equated through the time value of money calculation (Debreu, 1959).  Thus, these terms, current value versus opportunity cost, net to zero because,
when on assumed a constant and consistent there is no difference in economic value between using something now versus latter ceteris paribus.   
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For example, DNA, or symbolic language, encode information
about what works within the environment (Allen, 2001).  As a
result, it is reasonable to assume that, even in the face of gene-
ralized increases in input prices, technology leverage is an in-
creasing function of time, because it is unlikely that a new
technology will be adopted unless it increases the value crea-
tion equation.  In other words, τ (t) is a monotonically increa-
sing function, or ∂τ / ∂t  > 0.  What such reasoning implies for
conservation is that the longer one waits, the higher the tech-
nology leverage to be deployed against given resources. Because
this effect is not addressed in most current economic models,
it is fair to say that the negative value resulting from wasteful
consumption of resources is likely to have been systematically
underestimated in economic analysis. This leads to the follo-
wing proposition:
Proposition 4: IF technological leverage, τ ′, is assumed to be a
monotonically increasing function over time, and IF market pri-
cing in use implicitly assumes that technology leverage is cons-
tant,
THEN the opportunity cost in current dollars of using resources
today versus at some point in the future will be understated AND
if the rate of change over time in technology leverage is greater
than the discount rate, the value of conservation of resources will
be strictly positive.
Future research finding support for our proposition would
imply that there has been, and continues to be, systematic error
in financial analysis supporting resource utilization decisions.
Further, it would imply that the error leads to biased decisions
favoring the use of resources in the present, at the expense of
more highly leveraged uses in the future.  Correcting for said
bias would explicitly recognize the option value of conserva-
tion of resources within our economy.
POLICY AND GOVERNANCE IMPLICATIONS
With the above ideas in mind, we turn now to the normative
questions about how analysts should incorporate these ideas
into microeconomic decision models within the firm and in the
markets. We consider remedies in two distinct arenas, govern-
mental policy and firm governance. 
Government policy implications
How can national and international policy be modified to more
accurately measure value creation in national and global eco-
nomies? Much more research is needed to fully understand the
policy implications of this perspective. Some speculative ideas
do come to mind, however.   
One possible approach would involve defining certain scarce
natural resources as within the public domain, although pos-
sibly under private control. These resources would be subject
to consumption royalties paid into a fund that uses the market
mechanism to invest in technology innovations, possibly
through venture capital funds established for this purpose. A
key challenge would involve determining available stockpiles of
resources and forecasting technology leverage functions asso-
ciated with each resource to determine the appropriate royalty
level.  The policy objective would be to provide appropriate in-
centives and funding so that economic actors would develop
new technologies to better utilize diminished resources and
achieve a sustainable economy.  The royalties might be called
technology development royalties.
Set at the right levels, it is possible that the royalties could re-
place other forms of taxation, at least in some countries.  At
the same time they would provide an incentive to reduce con-
sumption to the lowest practical levels (although see discus-
sion of the Jevons paradox in what follows).  Doing so would
encourage uses that take advantage of high technology leve-
rage, encourage the development of improved technology, and
increase the economic incentive to recycle materials already in
service. Granted, the problem of setting royalty rates would be
challenging, highly uncertain, and subject to political influence.
However, the program could be phased in beginning with a pilot
that used a simple and rather uncontroversial case.  As an
example, a royalty could be imposed on a hard mineral such as
copper or uranium. Royalty proceeds might be used to invest
in the relevant economies and to support an international
board that sets the royalty rates and manages the system.  Im-
portantly, there would not be controls on who bought what,
but rather a royalty that reflected opportunity costs that would
be charged in all cases and without prejudice.
Firm Goverance Implications
An equally important question is how this approach to value
analysis would impact firm choices.   Perhaps the best way to
consider the question would be to look at the manner in which
financial markets would be affected if technology development
royalties were added to the cost of inputs to production.  The
simplest and most direct mechanism to impact decision making
within the firm is to influence if not change how shareholder
value is determined.  A technology development royalty would
accomplish this.  Because firms with low technology leverage
have a larger percent of their costs tied up in acquiring natural
resources, they would be the hardest hit.
Consider the copper royalty example described above. As the
policy took shape and seemed imminent, traded shares of com-
panies that use copper would immediately be priced down, and
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firms that used more copper would be priced down to a grea-
ter degree, as the cost of the royalty was priced into the mar-
ket.  This is because analysts would assume that the royalty
payment was a tax, or an incremental cost, that fell to the bot-
tom line in cash flow calculations.  With end use prices being
determined by market forces (assuming a sufficiently high de-
gree of competition), the increased cost could not be passed
through, at least initially, and the firm’s after tax cash flow would
be reduced by the pro rata amount.  Consequently, regardless
of how the firm's shares were priced, the effect would be to re-
duce share price by a proportional amount.  As the royalty in-
creased, profits, cash flow, and share price would be increasingly
under pressure.  The management of impacted firms would be
forced to make strategic changes.  For example, end user price
could be increased to improve margins, and these increases
would be met with reduced demand.  Eventually, a new equili-
brium would be reached with higher prices, lower volumes and
less depletion of resources. The net effect would be a shift in re-
source utilization from low leverage uses to high leverage uses.
Yet greater efficiency resulting from higher technological leve-
rage may lead to more, not less, resource consumption because
of an implied cost reduction –the so-called Jevons paradox.  This
is potentially true for increasing gains for a single use, such as
for internal combustion engines.  As greater value is provided
per unit of resource, volume increases in the case where the
demand curve increases with price declines at a faster rate than
the increase in profits from improved efficiency.  The logic does
not necessarily follow across knowledge intensive industries,
however. Each industry is governed by its own price curve.  In
highly technical markets such as semiconductors or pharma-
ceuticals, knowledge content, rather than commodity costs, dri-
ves prices.  Undoubtedly cases of increased consumption can be
found, but they are far less likely than in the single industry case.   
When economic incentives such as royalties are added to com-
modity markets that explicitly favor high technology leverage in-
dustries, more human and technical resources are likely to be
directed toward increasing technical leverage. As royalties in-
crease, consumption of the affected resource decreases, ide-
ally approaching conditions for sustainable development.  Even
in low leverage industries, firms will mostly invest in techno-
logy that increased its technology leverage, at least in the long
run. In such industries, consumption would likely increase for a
given royalty level.  Thoughtful policy could be implemented,
however, whereby increasing royalties with time would require
incremental technology gain just to maintain demand.  Overall,
this policy would have the treble positive effects of increasing
royalty revenue for investment in technology, maintaining firm
profits, and reducing the consumption of the scarce resources.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIREC-
TIONS
Value is created by the judicious use of technology and kno-
wledge in organizations, and by the enterprising actions of or-
ganizational actors as they transform input resources into
valuable outputs. Such a conception makes value creation logi-
cally distinct from the distribution of value to stakeholders (in-
cluding shareholders). 
We argue that value creation can be understood in the context of
the function, τ, that describes the output value of a firm in terms
of its inputs, together with its first partial derivative, τ ′, which we
call technology leverage. Technology leverage is relevant to sus-
tainability arguments because it highlights differences in the pos-
sible uses of resources. Greater technology leverage implies
greater realized value for the economy per unit of depleted re-
sources. As a result, policy relating to resource distribution me-
chanisms should favor these uses over others.  As we point out,
traditional pricing mechanisms do not necessarily achieve this
objective without some level of policy intervention. Such in-
tervention is particularly urgent as previously copious resour-
ces become increasingly scarce 
More research is needed to determine if the conclusions des-
cribed are supported empirically and to determine if differen-
ces in the uses of scarce resources across industries cause
aberrations in optimal distribution of resources as hypothesi-
zed. Moreover, research is needed to test the effectiveness of
various policy choices intended to influence resource distribu-
tion and thus the depletion rates of increasingly scarce resour-
ces such as air, water, land, wildlife and fossil fuels.
We nevertheless hope to have called attention to two impor-
tant issues. First, that value measurement must take account of
opportunity costs, or more specifically the option value resul-
ting from gains in technology leverage over time. Such costs are
much higher at present than they once were because the limi-
ting factor in production is natural resources, not labor. So long
as such costs are not recognized in value calculations, resour-
ces are likely to become a greater constraint over time. Second,
the complexity inherent in market processes increases expo-
nentially with economic scope. Inaccuracies that may be tole-
rable for a private firm, if repeated across all sectors and
industries, might produce decisions that result in intolerably
high costs for society. 
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